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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
EMIL MARTIN SUNTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14363 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Emil Martin Sunter, appeals 
from a conviction of the crime of attempted burglary 
entered against him in the DistrictCourt of the 
Seventh Judicial District, in and for Carbon County, 
State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty of 
the crime of attempted burglary by a jury and 
sentenced to serve in the Carbon County Jail for 
a term of nine (9) months. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court 
affirming the verdict and judgment rendered by the 
jury at the trial. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 7, 19 75, Helper City Police Officers 
received a tip that sometime during the night the 
appellant and three or four other persons would break 
into the Regis Club (T. 4, 16, 28, 43). That 
evening three police officers staked out the Club, 
two of them entering a nearby drug store (T« 4, 16, 
28). Sometime after midnight on July 8, the appellant 
pulled into an alleyway near the Club in his pickup 
truck (T. 5, 17). He walked to the back of the truck, 
grabbed a crowbar, and walked to the rear of the Club 
(T. 6, 17-18). Three or four minutes later he returned 
to the truck and then the appellant and three other 
men, which had joined the appellant, entered the 
rear of the Club (T. 6, 17). Shortly after leaving the 
Club the officers apprehended the four men, including 
the appellant (T. 6. 18). 
The next morning officers discovered that 
near the rear of the Club, where the appellant had 
taken the crowbar, a brick was freshly broken, 
splinters of wood were broken out, some louvers were 
marked with fresh scratches, the wood was scarred 
with fresh crowbar marks, and a screen was pried out, 
pulled forward, and bent (T. 9, 20-22, 45-46). 
The window had been inspected during the afternoon 
of the previous day and the screen was not loosened 
or pried open (T. 29)• 
Although the officers testified that the 
appellant had taken a crowbar from his truck to the 
area near the rear of the Club, the appellant testified 
that: 
(a) he did not have a crowbar in his 
truck (T. 56); 
(b) he did not own the crowbar introduced 
into evidence (T. 56); 
(c) he had not seen the crowbar prior to the 
trial (T. 56); 
(d) he did not carry a crowbar to the scene 
of the crime (T. 59) j? 
(e) he did not intend to burglarize the 
Regis Club (T. 59); 
(f) he did not intend to enter the building 
(T. 60); and 
(g) the testifying officers lied about 
his possession of a crowbar (T. 61). 
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Mr. Narone, a friend of appellant and one of those 
apprehended at the scene of the crime, testified that 
the crowbar was in another person's car, it was owned 
by a person other than the appellant, and this 
other person grabbed the bar when he got out of 
his car and walked up the alley toward the back of the 
buildings (T. 64~66)o 
At trial the court did not instruct the 
jury on the offense of manufacture or possession 
of an instrument for burglary or theft (To Doc. 13). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE CRIME OF MANUFACTURE 
OR POSSESSION OF AN INSTRUMENT FOR BURGLARY OR THEFT 
BECAUSE IT IS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THE 
CRIME OF ATTEMPTED BURGLARY. 
The appellant's argument hinges on whether the 
"manufacture or possession of an instrument for burglary 
or theft" is a lesser included offense of "Attempted 
burglary." Assuming that it is, appellant argues that 
the lower court failed to properly instruct the jury. 
i 
Respondent contends, however, that possession of an 
instrument for burglary or theft is not a lesser 
included offense of attempted burqlary and therefore 
i 
the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury 
on the unrelated crime. 
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Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (a) 
(Supp. 1973), a defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charged when: 
11
 (a) It is established by proof 
of the same or less than all the fact 
required to establish the commission of 
the offense charged. . ." 
This statute codifies the so-called "same evidence" 
test as defined in previous caselaw. See State v, 
Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 198, 371 P.2d 27 (1962); 
Williams v. Turner, 421 F.2d 168, 169 (10th Cir. 1971); 
and State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640, 645 
(1934)• In State v. Brennan, supra, Justice Crockett 
elaborated on the definition of a lesser included 
offense and stated: 
"The rule as to when one offense 
is included in another is that the 
greater offense includes a lesser 
one when establishment of the greater 
would necessarily include proof of 
all of the elements necessary to 
prove the lesser. Conversely, it 
is only when the proof of the lesser 
offense requires some element not 
involved in the greater offense that 
the lesser would not be an included 
offense." 13 Utah 2d at 197, 371 
P.2d at 29. 
Thus, in accordance with both the statutory and 
judicial definitions of a lesser included offense, it 
is necessary to look to the legal elements of the crimes 
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of attempted burglary and possession of an instrument 
for burglary or theft and compare them to see whether 
the elements of the latter were embraced within the 
elements of the former* 
Burglary is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§. 76-6-202(1) (Suppe 1973), as the following: 
"A person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building 
with intent to commit a felony or 
theft or commit an assault on any 
person." 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (Supp. 1973), a 
person is guilty of an attempt to commit burglary if: 
11
 (1) e . .acting with the kind of 
culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in 
conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense." 
On the other hand, '^ manufacture or possession 
of an instrument for burglary or theft" is defined 
as follows: 
"Any person who manufacturers or 
possesses any instrument, tool, device, 
article, or other thing adapted, designed, 
or commonly used in advancing or facili-
tating the commission of any offense 
under circumstances manifesting an 
intent to use or knowledge that some 
person intends to use the same in the 
commission of a burglary or theft is 
guilty of a Class B misdemeanor." 
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Merely by outlining the elements of the two crimes, 
it is clear that under the Brennan test proof of 
attempted burglary does not necessarily include 
proof of possession of an instrument for burglary 
or theft since proof of possession of an instrument 
for burglary requires an element which is not 
involved in the proof of attempted burglary. There 
is absolutely no requirement in a prosecution for 
attempted burglary that any instrument, tool, or 
device be used in performing the act. Furthermore, 
simply because the perpetrator of the crime used some 
instrument in commission of the act, does not make the 
possession of such an instrument a lesser included 
offense. For these reasons, respondent contends 
that the trial court properly rejected appellant's 
proposed instruction and therefore consideration of 
the evidence relating to the crowbar under Point II 
below, is unnecessary. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE CRIME OF MANUFACTURE OR 
POSSESSION OF AN INSTRUMENT FOR BURGLARY OR THEFT 
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
TO WARRANT SUCH AN INSTRUCTION. 
The well settled standard in Utah for deter-
mining whether instructions should be given or refused 
is whether there is "substantial" evidence presented 
to warrant an instruction on the evidence. In 
State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947), 
the appellant claimed error in his voluntary man-
slaughter conviction when the tiral court refused 
to instruct on excusable homicide„ This Court 
held, however, after reviewing the evidence, that: 
"There was no substantial evidence 
on the defense of excusable homicide, 
and therefore, an instruction to the 
jury on this phase of the law was 
unnecessaryc" (Emphasis added.) 
In addition, in State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 
2d 70, 457 P.2d 618 (1969), this Court held that: 
vv
. . . a defendant is entitled to 
have a jury instructed on his theory of 
the case, if there is any substantial 
evidence to justify giving such an 
instruction." (Emphasis added.) 
See also State v. Langley, 25 Utah 2d 29, 474 P.2d 
734 (1970); State v. McCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 435, 483 
P.2d 890 (1971); and State v. Taylor, P.2d (1976). 
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The appellant correctly points out that two 
of the police officers, who were eyewitnesses tc the 
crime, observed a crowbar in his possession. Never-
theless, this evidence is clearly not of sufficient 
substance to warrant an instruction on possession 
of an instrument for burglary or ti left. Evidence 
relating to the crowbar was not necessary to 
establish the crime of burglary and the only pur-
pose for which such evidence was introduced, was to 
•^.:i- the chain of events leading to the appellant's 
illegal act. 
In addition, however, the appellant fails to 
point out that his own testimony, as well as that 
of another defense witness, specifically rejected any 
connection with a crowbar* During his own testimony 
the appellant stated that: 
(a) he did not have a crowbar in his 
truck (T. 56); 
(b) he did not own the crowbar 
introduced into evidence (T. 56)? 
(c) he had not seen the crowbar prior 
to the trial (T. 56); 
(d) he did not carry a crowbar to the 
scene of the crime (T. 59); 
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(e) he did not intend to burglarize 
the Regis Club (T. 59); 
(f) he did not intend to enter the 
building (T. 60); and 
(g) the testifying officers lied 
about his possession of a crowbar 
^
V;--:-'>:/-vv (T. 61) * 
Moreover, Mr* Narone, a good friend of the appellant 
who was also apprehended at the scene of the crimef 
testified that the crowbar was in another person's 
car, it was owned by a person other than the appellant, 
and this other person grabbed the bar when he got out 
of his car and walked up the alley toward the back 
of the buildings (T. 64-66). 
From the above, it is clear that the appellant's 
argument is directly contrary to the proof which he 
presented at trial. In effect the appellant wants to 
deny that he owned, possessed, or used a crowbar 
on the one hand, and then, on the other hand, have the 
jury instructed otherwisec Respondent contends that 
the only rational conclusion is to deny the appellant's 
requested instruction, which allegedly is based on 
substantial evidence, when he has previously denied 
I 
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any substance of or connection whatsoever with 
the pertinent evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the crime of manufacture or possession 
of an instrument for burglary or theft is not a lesser 
included offense of the crime of attempted burglary, 
there was no substantial evidence to support this 
unrelated crime, and the appellant should not be 
allowed to deny the reliability of certain evidence 
and then claim error when the trial court refused 
to instruct the jury on such evidence, respondent 
respectfully requests this Court to dismiss 
appellant's appeal and grant judgment in accordance 
with the verdict and judgment rendered at the trial. 
Respectful ly submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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